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I. INTRODUCTION
In a time when quality health care is essential and medical malpractice
befalls patients on a daily basis,' peer review has become an institutionalized
practice,2 while information generated in the process has become a hot and
controversial commodity in legal discovery proceedings.' As an integral part
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Cen-
ter; B.S., University of Miami, School of Communications. The author wishes to give a spe-
cial thank you to her family for their continued love and encouragement in all that she does.
She would also like to thank Professor Debra Moss Curtis, Professor Kathy Cerminara, and
Professor David Cleveland for their guidance and direction.
1. See42U.S.C. § 11101(1) (2000).
2. Susan 0. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer
Review Information: More Imagined than Real, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 169 (1992-93).
3. See Christina A. Graham, Comment, Hide and Seek: Discovery in the Context of the
State and Federal Peer Review Privileges, 30 CUMB. L. REv. 111, 111 (2000). Discovery is
"[c]ompulsory disclosure, at a party's request, of information that relates to the litigation."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 498 (8th ed. 2004).
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of today's health care industry, "[p]eer review serves as one of medicine's
most effective risk management and quality improvement tools."4 By engag-
ing physicians in a review process of their colleagues' work,5 the "incompe-
tence in the medical profession" is weeded out, inevitably leading to better
patient care and a decrease in health and medical expenses. 6 Serving to ap-
plaud excellent medical care and uncover that which is inferior and sub par,7
peer review has truly made a name for itself in the medical community.8
It is with the help of statutory protection that this practice has become a
reality.9 Peer review statutes are geared toward guaranteeing participants
confidentiality, immunity, and/or privileges, l0 so as to stimulate sincere and
reliable discussions." However, this security is gradually starting to erode
as information, documents, and records linked to the peer review sessions
reach the public through the discovery process. l
While the purpose of peer review statutes appear to be sound and guile-
less, courts are still laboring to stabilize the particulars regarding discovery
4. Lisa M. Nijm, Pitfalls of Peer Review: The Limited Protections of State and Federal
Peer Review Law for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 541 (2003). Peer review occurs in
other areas besides just hospitals. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High
Cost But No Benefit-Is It Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 7 n.1 (1999). The
process is also administered "by nonhospital institutional providers such as freestanding sur-
gery centers, and by third-party payers of health care expenses." Id. Nevertheless, hospitals
still make the most frequent use of the process. Id.
5. David W. Jorstad, Note, The Legal Liability of Medical Peer Review Participants for
Revocation of Hospital Staff Privileges, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 692,692 (1978-79).
6. Alissa Marie Bassler, Comment, Federal Law Should Keep Pace with States and
Recognize a Medical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHO L. REv. 689, 692 (2003).
7. Ilene N. Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical
Malpractice Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1175, 1177 (2006).
8. See Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 169.
9. See George E. Newton II, Comment, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the
Social and Judicial Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REv. 723, 727
(2001); see also Cruger v. Love (Love fl), 599 So. 2d 111, 113 (Fla. 1992).
10. Nijm, supra note 4, at 546.
11. LovelI,599So.2datll4.
[T]he purpose of a statute that shields medical review committee records and materials from
discovery and prevents their use as evidence in certain civil actions is to promote candor and
frank exchange in peer-review proceedings, and that a statute protecting the proceedings, re-
cords, and files of medical review committees from discovery in civil actions was intended to
provide broad statutory protection and was based on legislative appreciation that a high level
of confidentiality is necessary for effective medical peer review.
81 AM. JuR. 2D Witnesses § 537 (2004).
12. See Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 590 (Fla. 2007) (holding that a
hospital's list of a physician's privileges is discoverable). "[P]eer review information might
fall vulnerable to discovery for claims brought under federal law, because no federal peer
review privilege exists." Nijm, supra note 4, at 542.
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of peer review documents and records as to be employed in legal actions. 3
Naturally, there are those who advocate for peer review and the good they
believe it brings 4 while there are those who criticize the process for the neg-
ative effects they allege it causes. 5 As a result, "an aura of controversy has
surrounded the idea of allowing health care personnel to police them-
selves." 16
To date, a peer review statute of some kind has been passed in almost
every state. ' 7 Notwithstanding the fact that most statutes are read and inter-
preted differently, they still uniformly strive to further the same goals.1 8
Historically, Florida peer review statutes have been construed extremely
broadly.' 9 Litigants seeking materials during discovery that were generated
in peer review sessions were hard pressed to recover anything."0 Such a
statutory interpretation allowed physicians and hospitals to freely partake in
the peer review process without the looming fear of litigation and liability
haunting them in the future.2'
Recently, however, these consistent Florida rulings of denying produc-
tion of materials associated with peer review during discovery have suddenly
come to a standstill. Bending the shield of statutory protection, the Supreme
Court of Florida has taken an atypical approach in resolving a recent case.22
Widening the eyes of both proponents and critics of peer review, the Su-
preme Court of Florida granted the release of hospital records containing
physician privileges.23 In addition to serving as a great stride for litigants
13. Graham, supra note 3, at 111.
14. See Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1177.
15. Bassler, supra note 6, at 695.
16. Christopher S. Morter, Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986:
Will Physicians Find Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REv. 1115, 1115 (1988).
17. Bassler, supra note 6, at 694; see also Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 198-217.
These pages provide a list of each state that furnishes a statute relating to peer review. See
Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 198-217. The chart accompanying the list provides a
"[s]ummary of [s]tate [p]eer [rieview [s]tatutes" and includes information about the state, their
statute, and whom and what it protects. Id.
18. See Nijm, supra note 4, at 546.
19. Karen 0. Emmanuel, The Peer Review Privilege in Florida, FLA. B.J., July/Aug.
1994, at 64; see also Tenet HealthSystem Hosps., Inc. v. Taitel, 855 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
20. Graham, supra note 3, at 125-26.
21. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1178.
22. See Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 595 (Fla. 2007). The Supreme
Court of Florida granted the rltease of a hospital's list of physician privileges during discov-
ery. Id. at 590. In the past, it has restricted discovery of most materials related to peer review.
See, e.g., Cruger v. Love (Love I1), 599 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992).
23. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 590.
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seeking certain discovery materials in medical malpractice suits, 24 this case
awakes attention to the split between the district courts in Florida.25
This article will examine peer review in Florida, focusing on a recent
case from the Supreme Court of Florida that has generated a split among the
district courts. The first section discusses the history, background, and gen-
eral statutory protection surrounding peer review. It will additionally probe
into the opinions of both proponents and critics of the process. Part III spe-
cifically outlines the history of peer review in Florida and looks at the rele-
vant statutes that govern the process today. Additionally, this section ex-
plores the case of Brandon Regional Hospital v. Murray.26 Part IV discusses
the split among the Florida district courts and explicitly looks into the hold-
ings of certain cases. Part V considers the implications of each side of the
split, scrutinizing both the benefits and consequences.
II. THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS
Peer review is a process whereby specifically qualified medical associ-
ates of a hospital evaluate "the qualifications, training, and experience" 27 of
other practicing medical physicians and personnel, as well as monitor their
"medical outcomes and professional conduct. 28 The medical review staff
seeks to ascertain whether the aforesaid physicians and personnel are capable
and competent to practice medicine in the hospital and, in the event that they
are, what the boundaries and limitations of their practice consist of.29 De-
spite the fact that a hospital makes the final judgment as to whether or not a
doctor may practice and, if so, to what extent, it is peer review reports and
analysis which provide the foundation for such a hospital decision.3 Conse-
quently, a hospital's choice to authorize admittance to their medical staff, as
24. Daniel Ostrovsky, Hospital Privileges Must Be Revealed in Med-Mal Cases, DAILY
Bus. REV., May 11, 2007, at Al.
25. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 591-93.
26. Id. at 590.
27. Nijm, supra note 4, at 543.
28. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 13. The initial portion of the process is generally known
as "credentialing." Id. at 14. Once a physician has been granted privileges and they begin
practicing, the peer review process additionally includes an evaluation of "quality assurance
data, diagnostic and laboratory utilization reports, and other information regarding each staff
member's actual practice at the hospital." Id. Typically, a physician must undergo peer re-
view of their hospital privileges every two years; nevertheless, if concerns arise regarding
their behavior before said time, a review will be in order. Id.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Newton II, supra note 9, at 725.
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well as grant or deny certain privileges, is largely influenced by the peer re-
view process, committee, and their findings.3
A. History of Peer Review
A general survey of medical peer review history reveals that in 1918,
the American College of Surgeons established the Hospital Accreditation
Program, which ultimately grew into the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO).32 JCAHO mandates that hospitals
have an abiding system by which physicians are to be evaluated.33 "[T]o
receive JCAHO accreditation, hospitals must" partake in certain procedures
which will ensure quality health care, including but not limited to, peer re-
view."4 "Accreditation plays a vital role in the economic survival of a hospi-
tal, as eligibility for federal funds, such as Medicare and Medicaid, depends
upon it."
35
In addition to JCAHO and the assistance it provides in attempting to
improve the health care industry, 36 Congress has addressed the issue by pass-
ing federal legislation known as the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986 (HCQIA).37 Concerned with the "overriding national need to provide
incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective professional
peer review,"3 Congress enacted HCQIA as an initial step toward a solu-
tion.39 Operating with the specific function of promoting "good faith peer
review,"4 and medical care, the Act fosters two chief objectives.4  Fore-
31. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 13.
32. Bassler, supra note 6, at 691. In an effort to address the inferiority of patient health
care, the Hospital Accreditation Program was enacted. Id. "[T]his organization attempted to
combat the problem by establishing minimum standards of quality." Morter, supra note 16, at
1116.
33. Morter, supra note 16, at 1117.
34. Nijm, supra note 4, at 544.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1179. Before Congress passed HCQIA, the only protec-
tion afforded to medical peer review was that provided by the states. Scheutzow & Gillis,
supra note 2, at 177. Currently, federal law does not provide "a medical peer review privi-
lege." Nijm, supra note 4, at 542.
38. 42U.S.C. § 11101(5)(2000).
39. Morter, supra note 16, at 1120. HCQIA is the only piece of federal legislation on the
issue of peer review. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 177.
40. Morter, supra note 16, at 1115.
41. Yann H.H. van Geertruyden, Comment, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: How the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and State Peer Review Protection Statutes
Have Helped Protect Bad Faith Peer Review in the Medical Community, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 239, 245 (2001).
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most, HCQIA grants immunity from damages to those individuals actively
involved and contributing in the peer review process.42 However, it "does
not grant a federal evidentiary privilege to the records and deliberations of
the peer review process. 43 Furthermore, HCQIA was implemented to gen-
erate the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), a "national clearinghouse
of information."'  By making it obligatory that hospitals submit reports con-
cerning physicians and medical staff who have had disciplinary problems 4
5
and clinical privileges reduced or removed, NPDB prevents incompetent
individuals from moving to other hospitals without exemption from punish-
ment.46
B. Statutory Scheme Overview
For peer review to be an effective tool in the health care industry there
must be regulations that accompany its use.47 While the purpose of peer
review is to generate better patient care and improve the quality of physi-
42. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 9. The peer review board must satisfy four procedural
criteria to become eligible for immunity from damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1111 l(a)(1) (2000).
First, the board's actions must have been exercised with a sound belief that it was fostering
quality health care. Id. § 11112(a)(1). Second, in acquiring the facts, the board must have
employed a reasonable effort. Id. § 111 12(a)(2). Third, the board must provide the physician
with sufficient notice and a hearing or other measures which under the circumstances are just.
Id § 111 12(a)(3). Last, after complying with the aforementioned requirements, the board
must believe that the actions they took were reasonably justifiable. Id. § I 1112(a)(4). It is
presumed that the peer review board's actions satisfy the four procedural criteria; however,
this is a "rebuttable presumption." Anthony W. Rodgers, Procedural Protections During
Medical Peer Review: A Reinterpretation of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986, 111 PENN ST. L. REv. 1047, 1053 (2007). If it can be illustrated through a preponder-
ance of the evidence that at least one of the four criteria have not been complied with, a physi-
cian may disprove this presumption. Id. at 1053-54; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a).
43. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 9-10. The question of whether the "'peer review privi-
lege' applies to the discovery of documents created during the peer review process" is still
lingering as unanswered. Graham, supra note 3, at 112.
44. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 10.
45. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1180. Disciplinary actions include when a physician's
privileges are reduced, temporarily withdrawn, or entirely recalled. Id.
46. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 10. In addressing the nationwide quandary of incompe-
tent physicians traveling from state to state to practice medicine, HCQIA demands that hospi-
tals and other medical personal report to the NPDB "peer review actions resulting in limita-
tions to a physician's medical staff or clinical privileges and to report when physicians volun-
tarily surrender their medical staff privileges in lieu of facing a peer review investigation." Id.
Additionally, the punitive and corrective measures that a physician is sanctioned with must be
communicated to the NPDB. Graham, supra note 3, at 112.
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(5).
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cians practicing,48 this will only occur with honest and outspoken discus-
sions.4 "It is obvious that both complaints and free discussion about the
activities of physicians would be markedly discouraged if their contents were
to be held open to public perusal."5° Accordingly, without some definitive
security guaranteed to those who participate, this practice will never become
a reality."
In the past, physicians have been averse to participating in peer re-
view.2 While currently, the process appears to be sound, the possibility of
future consequences is a brewing fear.53 Physicians do not want to find
themselves entangled in a web of legal action initiated by an unhappy medi-
cal associate who was given poor reviews or had privileges revoked.54 The
negative repercussions that may strike a physician after a substandard review
can have lasting effects, including but not limited to, a damaged reputation,
loss of income, patients, and malpractice insurance, the stigma of having
received negative reviews, and possibly the inability to find employment
elsewhere." The aforesaid reasons are all ammunition for future lawsuits
and no physicians would choose to partake in a process that would leave
them behind the barrel of a loaded gun. "While a physician may be willing
to chastise a physician in private and, for example, suggest sanctions such as
remedial training, the physician almost assuredly would not like his com-
ments aired on the six o'clock news. 56
As a result, almost every state has fashioned some version of a peer re-
view statute57 in which they guarantee privileges, immunity, and/or confi-
dentiality.18 "In granting these protections, legislatures have determined that
limiting the rights of physicians to seek damages for peer review actions and
denying malpractice plaintiffs and other litigants information relevant to their
lawsuits are justified in order to encourage effective peer review."59
48. Matthew J. Cate, Physician Peer Review: Serving the Patient or the Physician?, 20
J. LEGAL MED. 479, 483 (1999).
49. See 81 AM. JuR. 2D Witnesses § 537 (2004).
50. Dade County Med. Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 119 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(5).
52. Newton II, supra note 9, at 726.
53. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 16.
54. See Newton II, supra note 9, at 727.
55. Rodgers, supra note 42, at 1049-51.
56. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 174.
57. Josephine M. Hammack, Comment, The Antitrust Laws and the Medical Peer Review
Process, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 419, 440-41 (1993).
58. Nijm, supra note 4, at 546.
59. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 8.
2007]
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1. Privileges
An authorized privilege in law safeguards particular information from
discovery and use in civil litigation.6" The court assumes the role of "bal-
anc[ing] privilege against a plaintiffs right to due process and the judicial
need for the fair administration of justice.,, 61 Accordingly, a court acknowl-
edging the existence of a privilege is essentially saying, without speaking,
that "it values that social policy goal [of keeping information free from dis-
covery or use in civil litigation] over and above the potential impact of the
privilege on the truth-seeking process."62 As a result, a judicially granted
privilege functions as an exemption from the everyday liability one would
incur in having to provide information during a judicial proceeding.63
2. Confidentiality
Confidentiality mandates that a party abstain from revealing any and all
information pertaining to, and discussed in, the peer review process, outside
a court of law.' 4 A party may be obliged "to keep information confidential"
by means of law or contract. 65 This requirement absolves physicians of the
fear that their direct and blunt communications will be exposed to those be-
60. Nijm, supra note 4, at 546. To be specific, "forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia have" passed statutes dealing with the peer review privilege. Bassler, supra note 6,
at 694. In the discovery process, when a party to a lawsuit asserts the peer review privilege
the burden of proof rests on them to demonstrate that the information requested is statutorily
protected. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 537 (2004).
61. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 537 (2004).
62. Nijm, supra note 4, at 547. In Trammel v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court proclaimed that "[tiestimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the funda-
mental principle that 'the public.., has a right to every man's evidence."' 445 U.S. 40, 50
(1980) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). As a result, the United
States Supreme Court has warned courts dealing with privileges to be prudent, as granting
them endorse a strong social message. See Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 180. "Even
in discussing the widely accepted attorney-client and priest-penitent privileges, the Court has
urged caution in their application." Id.
63. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 179.
64. Nijm, supra note 4, at 548. The court in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc. under-
scored the fundamental reasoning behind implementing confidentiality statutes. See Bredice
v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970); Gregory G. Gosfield, Medical Peer
Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 566 (1979).
65. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 192. While many states claim to protect confi-
dential information through statutory law, they provide no punishment or remedy should such
information be revealed. Nijm, supra note 4, at 548-49. Nonetheless, there are eight states
which do impose sanctions for a violation of confidentiality statutes. Id. at 549.
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ing reviewed.66 Generally, information which is privileged is also confiden-
tial.67
3. Immunity
Immunity operates as a shield for participants from civil litigation that
may emerge in the future.68 When a physician is unhappy with the outcome
of his or her peer review session, his actions are unpredictable and may result
in a lawsuit. 69 As such, the grant of immunity may range from hospitals, to
the peer review board, and anyone who may submit evidence to the board. 7°
However, while immunity may protect participants from civil suits, it does
not automatically protect the information generated in the session.7'
C. Two Sides to Every Story
For as long as it has been around, peer review has been an issue of dis-
pute.72 The discipline and regulation of medical professionals is a sensitive
matter and must be handled with the utmost justice.73 Debates surrounding
whether peer review is the correct and best way to manage the health care
industry have been argued at length.74 Debates surrounding the discoverabil-
ity of peer review materials are more recent arguments but nonetheless seem
to be the new black of medical malpractice disputes.75 As with everything,
there are two sides to every story!
1. Proponents of Peer Review
Advocates of medical peer review urge that "physicians possess the
specialized knowledge necessary to make accurate medical judgments and
66. See Newton II, supra note 9, at 729.
67. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 192.
68. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 17. To be specific, forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have passed statutes dealing with peer review immunity. Id. at 28.
69. Seeid.at10-11.
70. Newton II, supra note 9, at 730.
71. Cate, supra note 48, at 483-84. "While the notion of immunity is somewhat consis-
tent in the law, the status of peer review information as privileged information is not." Id. at
484.
72. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1182.
73. See id.
74. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 16.
75. See Graham, supra note 3, at 111; see also infra notes 110, 112 and accompanying
text.
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can routinely observe one another in the workplace setting."76 It is this pro-
ficient and expert knowledge that makes the peer review process superior to
other procedures, such as, "lay review boards or judicial oversight.,7 7 The
judgments rendered during these sessions inexorably lead to first rate patient
care, safer medical procedures, and doctors who are truly equipped to prac-
tice medicine.7" Additionally, peer review impels doctors to practice with a
greater and more sophisticated degree of care and attention.79
Peer review offers an incentive for similarly trained physicians
working in the same environment to identify colleagues with
knowledge gaps or deficiencies in technical skills, facilitate their
remediation, and monitor their progress and performance, in pref-
erence to external parties assuming this responsibility. In addition,
when serious problems are identified, appropriate steps can be tak-
en to limit doctors' contact with patients well before government
agencies are involved or can act. Peer review may also lead physi-
cians to seek and accept help for medical, psychiatric, or impair-
ment issues. Finally, peer review groups can promptly refer safety
and quality issues they identify to committees or authorities em-
powered to address them within an institution. 0
Above and beyond the aforementioned benefits of peer review is that of
protecting a hospital's reputation.8' Although hospitals open themselves up
"to antitrust liability when" they engage in the peer review process, 82 the
salutary effect it has in discovering and controlling "incompetent physicians"
before a medical malpractice suit is filed is sensational.8 3 Consequently, a
hospital can deal with the physician accordingly, before problems escalate
and the hospital begins to build a horrible reputation or worse, finds itself
vicariously liable in a lawsuit.'
76. Nijm, supra note 4, at 543.
77. Morter, supra note 16, at 1118.
78. Jorstad, supra note 5, at 693.
79. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1177.
80. Id. at 1177-78.
81. Barbara K. Miller, Note, Defending the System: Application of the Intraenterprise
Immunity Doctrine in Physician Peer Review Antitrust Cases, 75 TEX. L. REV. 409, 411
(1996).
82. Id. at 409.
83. Id. at411.
84. Id. at410.
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2. Critics of Peer Review
In spite of the rah-rah that surrounds peer review there are still those
who have their doubts.85 Arguing that peer review performs a great disser-
vice to the general public, critics base their reasoning on "a 'conspiracy of
silence' that [they believe] enables health care practitioners to cover up evi-
dence of neglect."86 Subsequently, the court system feeds into this conspir-
acy by denying those patients seeking to prosecute ill practicing hospitals
and physicians, materials produced during peer review.87 As a result, peer
review and its accompanying statutes end up concealing information during
discovery, which could make or break a medical malpractice case.88 Addi-
tionally, those opposed to peer review contend that it "does not adequately
improve healthcare quality and safety" as the process does not tackle true
areas of concern and is never fully followed through with.89 Quite often two
situations present themselves: 1) physicians facing severe consequences
simply resign instead of complying with the peer review board's disciplinary
orders; 90 or 2) a hospital will recognize a doctor's resignation as quid pro
quo for silence. 91 To add insult to injury, many times when a hospital ac-
cepts a physician's resignation they fail to inform the NPDB about such inci-
dents, consequently eliminating its purpose.92 Moreover, many critics urge
that peer review "is used as a tool for economic or political motives-in es-
sence a review performed in bad faith, or with malice."93 However, despite
such opposition to the peer review process and the limitations it places on
discoverable material,94 critics are slowly getting what they wished for as the
barriers blocking information generated in peer review are collapsing little
by little. 95
85. Bassler, supra note 6, at 695.
86. Morter, supra note 16, at 1115 (quoting B. Abbott Goldberg, The Peer Review Privi-
lege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 160-61 (1984)).
87. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1182.
88. See id. at 1183; see also Columbia/JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P'ship v. Sanguonchitte, 920
So. 2d 711, 712 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
89. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1186.
90. Id.
91. Newton II, supra note 9, at 732.
92. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1186.
93. H.H. van Geertruyden, supra note 41, at 241.
94. Graham, supra note 3, at 114.
95. See Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 590 (Fla. 2007).
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III. PEER REVIEW IN FLORIDA
Having been legislatively cultivated, the peer review privilege is not ac-
knowledged as being a product of any common law principles.96 Conse-
quently, the protection afforded to hospitals and physicians are rooted in the
statutory protection that each state provides.97 Currently, such statutory se-
curity is "inconsistent" among the states. 98  Where some states impart a
heavy safeguard against peer review information being accessed during dis-
covery, others provide mild assurance that confidential information will not
be readily available to the public.99
As it stood until recently, Florida acquiesced to the group of states
which yielded strong protection against peer review information, or that re-
lated to it, being procurable during discovery.' 00 Pioneering the idea of the
"expansive privilege approach" with regard to the peer review statute, Flor-
ida has been a forerunner in the enactment of legislation concerning this mat-
ter.'01 Long before peer review legislation was a thought in the mind of
Congress or other states, Florida had already passed statutes pertaining to the
subject; these statutes have since been restructured and revised.'02
Historically, case law in Florida has supported the proposition of broad-
ly construing peer review statutes. '03 Insisting that peer review records, in-
formation, and documents remain privileged and confidential, it has been
difficult for anyone bringing a lawsuit against a hospital, physician, or peer
review committee to gain access to said information in the discovery proc-
ess. "0 The Supreme Court of Florida in Holly v. Auld... stated, "[w]e must
96. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 181.
97. Nijm, supra note 4, at 546.
98. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at 171.
While there appears to be widespread belief that information presented in peer review proceed-
ings and the deliberation of such committees are privileged and are to remain confidential, the
reality is that peer review proceedings are afforded very little privilege and confidentiality pro-
tection pursuant to federal law and very inconsistent protection by state law.
Id.
99. See JONATHAN P. TOMES, MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES AND PEER REVIEW: A LEGAL
GUIDE FOR HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 133 (1994); Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 2, at
198-217; Bassler, supra note 6, at 694; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
100. Emmanuel, supra note 19, at 61; Graham, supra note 3, at 125-26; see also infra note
112 and accompanying text.
101. Graham, supra note 3, at 125.
102. Id.
103. Emmanuel, supra note 19, at 64.
104. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth. v. Lopez, 678 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that even though the information was not kept confidential by the hospi-
tal, the records of the medical peer review committee were privileged); Love v. Cruger (Love
1), 570 So. 2d 362, 362-63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd 599 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla.
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assume that the legislature balanced this potential detriment [of preventing
disclosure of material in discovery] against the potential for health care cost
containment offered by effective self-policing by the medical community and
found the latter to be of greater weight." 106 However, as will be seen in the
later analysis of Brandon Regional Hospital v. Murray, this steady corner-
stone of Florida judicial case law is slowly starting to change, permitting the
discovery of certain information. 
107
A. Statutory Protection
Florida Statutes section 766.101 provides for the peer review privi-
lege.'0 8 Moreover, sections 395.0191 and 395.0193 encompass information
which serves to protect "hospital investigations and proceedings pertaining to
medical staff membership, clinical privileges, and disciplinary actions by
hospitals against members of its medical staff."' 0 9  The pertinent part of
Florida Statutes section 766. 101 states:
The investigations, proceedings, and records of a committee as de-
scribed in the preceding subsections shall not be subject to discov-
ery or introduction into evidence in any civil or administrative ac-
tion against a provider of professional health services arising out
of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by
such committee, and no person who was in attendance at a meeting
of such committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any
such civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or
presented during the proceedings of such committee or as to any
findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other actions
of such committee or any members thereof.110
1992) (holding that a physician's application to the hospital for staff privileges were undis-
coverable); Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 221 (Fla. 1984) (holding that the records of a cre-
dentialing committee were privileged from discovery as well as an investigation into those
participants involved in the decision-making process of whether or not to grant privileges).
105. 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984).
106. Id. at 220.
107. Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 595 (Fla. 2007).
108. FLA. STAT. § 766.101 (2007).
109. Emmanuel, supra note 19, at 61; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 395.0191, .0193 (2007).
110. FLA. STAT. § 766.101(5). Subsection five of this statute also states that:
[tInformation, documents, or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be
construed as immune from discovery or use in any such civil action merely because they were
presented during proceedings of such committee, nor should any person who testifies before
such committee or who is a member of such committee be prevented from testifying as to mat-
ters within his or her knowledge, but the said witness cannot be asked about his or her testi-
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Florida Statutes section 395.0191 states:
The investigations, proceedings, and records of the board, or agent
thereof with whom there is a specific written contract for the pur-
poses of this section, as described in this section shall not be sub-
ject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action
against a provider of professional health services arising out of
matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such
board, and no person who was in attendance at a meeting of such
board or its agent shall be permitted or required to testify in any
such civil action as to any evidence or other matters produced or
presented during the proceedings of such board or its agent or as to
any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other ac-
tions of such board or its agent or any members thereof. "'
The aforesaid two statutes have been utilized by hospitals and peer re-
view committees as a perpetual weapon to combat discovery requests made
by malpractice victims. 112 Because Florida's past interpretation of these stat-
mony before such a committee or opinions formed by him or her as a result of said committee
hearings.
Id.
111. FLA. STAT. § 395.0191(8). Subsection eight of this statute also states that:
[I]nformation, documents, or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be
construed as immune from discovery or use in any such civil action merely because they were
presented during proceedings of such board; nor should any person who testifies before such
board or who is a member of such board be prevented from testifying as to matters within his
or her knowledge, but such witness cannot be asked about his or her testimony before such a
board or opinions formed by him or her as a result of such board hearings.
Id.
112. See Columbia/JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P'ship v. Sanguonchitte, 920 So. 2d 711, 713 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding in a suit for medical malpractice that section 766.101(5)
protects information and documents regarding a physician's credentials); Tenet HealthSystem
Hosps., Inc. v. Taitel, 855 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding in medi-
cal malpractice action that blank forms created by the peer review committee for examining
and assessing a nurse's capability to practice medicine were protected by Florida Statute
section 766.101(5)); Columbia Hosp. Corp. of So. Dade v. Barrera, 738 So. 2d 505, 505-06
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that under section 766.101(5) and section 395.0191(8) a
hospital is not required to produce a physician's application for staff privileges in discovery);
Ornda Healthcorp. v. Berghof, 722 So. 2d 961, 962 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
in the discovery proceedings of a malpractice case the hospital was not obliged to produce the
doctor's application for staff privileges or malpractice insurance according to section
766.101(5)); Munroe Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Rountree, 721 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that under section 766.101(5) a doctor was not required to respond to
deposition questions pertaining to his interim suspension of staff privileges as his answers
could only have been materialized from peer review committee knowledge and information);
Palm Beach Gardens Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 651 So. 2d 783, 784 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding in a malpractice action that a list of complaints regarding the physician's
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utes has been all encompassing, hospitals and peer review committees are
able to shield information they deem to be private and confidential, regard-
less of the fact that such information may be pertinent, and many times in-
dispensable, to a fair and just trial.113 Furthermore, on the off chance that a
court does not find for protecting the requested information pursuant to Flor-
ida Statutes section 766.101 and/or section 395.0191, the public policy ar-
gument in favor of doing so has found its way to the top of justifications for
nondisclosure. 114
B. Amendment 7
Because Florida has always taken such an active role in the peer review
process and the legislation that accompanies it,"' it came as no surprise
when one of its citizens, in 2004, proposed Amendment 7 on the Florida bal-
lot. 16 Amendment 7, also known as the "Patients' Right-to-Know About
Adverse Medical Incidents Act," is intended to authorize patients "access to
any records made or received in the course of business by a health care facil-
ity or provider relating to any adverse medical incident."" 7 However, with
care of other patients were privileged from discovery under § 766.101(5)); Mount Sinai Med.
Ctr. of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Bernstein, 645 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that a request for specific information pertaining to the medical peer review commit-
tee was inappropriate and not discoverable); Tarpon Springs Gen. Hosp. v. Hudak, 556 So. 2d
831, 832 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a physician's application for staff privi-
leges was protected by section 766.10 1).
113. O'Brien, 651 So. 2d at 784 (stating that the "inability to get this information will
make it difficult for [the claimants] to prosecute a claim."); Sanguonchitte, 920 So. 2d at 712
(stating that it was irrelevant that the plaintiffs would have an arduous time prosecuting their
claim without peer review and hospital documents and information).
114. Sanguonchitte, 920 So. 2d at 712. "[T]here is an overwhelming public policy in
favor of maintaining the privilege to encourage self-regulation by the medical profession." Id.
115. See Graham, supra note 3, at 125.
116. Amendment 7: The Patients' Right to Know Flexes It's Muscle in Florida, LAW
WATCH (Foley & Lardner LLP, Orlando, Fla.), May 25, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Amendment 7].
117. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(a). For purposes of this statute, "have access to any re-
cords" signifies the standard procedures for procuring records in addition to "making the
records available for inspection and copying upon.., request by the patient.., provided that
current records which have been made publicly available by publication or on the Internet
may be 'provided' by reference to the location at which the records are publicly available."
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(c)(4). "Records" describe the ultimate and finished report of an
adverse medical incident. FLA. STAT. § 381.028(3)0) (2007). This does not include drafts,
outlines, or rough copies of documents. Id. Anything which is protected by the attorney-
client privilege or the attorney-client work product will not be deemed a record. Id. Adverse
medical incidents as defined in the statute constitute "medical negligence, intentional miscon-
duct, and any other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility or health care provider that
caused or could have caused injury to or death of a patient." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(c)(3).
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that said, the Florida Legislature also explicitly maintained the position that
Amendment 7 was not designed to abolish or alter current peer review
laws. '18
The enactment of Amendment 7 in Florida triggered a whirlwind of liti-
gation. " 9 In Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 20 and Notami Hos-
pital of Florida, Inc. v. Bowen,12' Florida courts addressed and responded to
the confusion and questions which surrounded this new piece of legisla-
tion. 122 A chief issue encasing Amendment 7 was the inquiry into whether or
not it preempted the already established statutory privilege by now allowing
the discoverability of peer review information that these statutes have sought
to protect. 123 The response by both courts was uniform in that Amendment
7 did preempt the statutory privilege. 124
Reading the provisions of Amendment 7 in parimateria so it forms
a congruous whole, and construing the provisions broadly and giv-
ing them a more liberal interpretation than we would a statute, we
come to the conclusion that Amendment 7 preempts the statutory
privileges afforded health care providers regarding their self-
policing procedures to the extent that such information is obtain-
able through a formal discovery request made by a patient or pa-
tient's legal-representative during the course of litigation. 125
Amendment 7 is extremely explicit about what is and is not discover-
able in litigation. 126 As it stands today, the lingering question seems to be
whether or not it can be applied retroactively. 127 Both Buster and Bowen
reached different conclusions concerning this matter. 28  Buster held that
Amendment 7 does not apply retroactively 129 while Bowen held that it should
be "prospective in operation" while applying retroactively to existing re-
118. FLA. STAT. § 381.028(2). On account of the fact that Amendment 7 was not men-
tioned as an area of concern in the trial or appellate dealings of Murray there is no reason to
analyze or apply it. Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 591-92 n.2 (Fla. 2007).
119. Amendment 7, supra note 116, at 1.
120. 932 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
121. 927 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
122. See Amendment 7, supra note 116, at 1; see also Bowen, 927 So. 2d at 143-44; Bus-
ter, 932 So. 2d at 348-51, 353-55.
123. Buster, 932 So. 2d at 348.
124. Amendment 7, supra note 116, at 1; see also Bowen, 927 So. 2d at 143 n.1; Buster
932 So. 2d at 351.
125. Buster, 932 So. 2d at 350-51.
126. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25; FLA. STAT. § 381.028 (2007).
127. Bowen, 927 So. 2d at 144; Buster, 932 So. 2d at 353.
128. Amendment 7, supra note 116, at 2.
129. Buster, 932 So. 2d at 354.
[Vol. 32
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 8
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol32/iss1/8
MEDICAL PEER REVIEW IN FLORIDA
cords.'30 Currently, the Supreme Court of Florida has approved a hearing of
both cases. 3'
C. Brandon Regional Hospital v. Murray
Presently in Florida, the buffer of statutory protection that has been fur-
nished to its citizens and institutions is slowly starting to crumble. Shying
away from the routine and typical court decisions which prevent discovery of
peer review information or that pertaining to it,'32 the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida, in May 2007, rendered a verdict with an unusual holding.'33 In Murray,
the Court held that in discovery proceedings, a person bringing a medical
malpractice action is empowered to procure from the hospital the privileges
granted to a physician. '34 However, claimants are "not entitled to the" con-
crete documents which the peer review credentialing committee utilized in
aiding the hospital in their decisions to grant or deny such privileges.'35
Therefore, even though the actual peer review documents themselves are still
privileged,'36 the ultimate result of what was decided in their meeting, which
hospitals use as a guiding source,' 37 is discoverable.'38
In Murray, a medical malpractice suit was initiated against Brandon
Regional Hospital (BRH). 139  The Murrays contended that Dr. Wayne S.
Blocker, the physician who operated on Mrs. Murray, was inappropriately
credentialed to perform her surgery. '40 As a result of his negligence in carry-
ing out the operation, Mrs. Murray was gravely injured. '' The complica-
tions of the lawsuit arose during the discovery process when the Murrays
sought to obtain a list of the privileges granted to Dr. Blocker by the hospi-
tal. 142 Such privileges were based upon communications which took place
130. Bowen, 927 So. 2d at 142.
131. Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1184.
132. See Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 592 (Fla. 2007); see supra note
112 and accompanying text.
133. See Murray, 957 So. 2d at 590.
134. Id. The "clinical privileges" granted to a physician are defined by JCAHO as the
ability to offer medical treatment or other such care to patients in a hospital. TOMES, supra
note 99, at 13. Such treatment and care is founded upon the doctor's experience, proficiency,
and qualifications. Id.
135. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 590.
136. Id.
137. H.H. van Geertruyden, supra note 41, at 243-44.
138. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 590.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 590-91.
141. Id. at 591.
142. Id.
2007]
17
Storch: Medical Peer Review in Florida: Is the Privilege Under Attack?
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
NOVA LA WREVIEW
among the peer review credentials committee.143  BRH and Dr. Blocker
countered the discovery request with a demand for a protective order, pursu-
ant to Florida Statutes sections 395.0191 and 766.101.'" After denying the
motion, the trial court directed BRH to come forth with the list of privi-
leges.145 Upon BRH's challenge to this decision, the Second District, al-
though recognizing discord among other district court decisions, confirmed
the trial court's order.'46 The Supreme Court of Florida permitted review of
the case as a result of "the Second District's decision being in express and
direct conflict with other district court decisions."' 47
The core question facing the Court "is whether a list generated by a
hospital, which includes a peer review committee recommendation delineat-
ing the privileges given to a member of a hospital staff, is protected from
discovery under the confidentiality provisions of sections 395.0191 and
766.101, Florida Statutes."'48 This inquiry merits an explanation from the
Supreme Court of Florida as the opinions among the Florida district courts
regarding this issue differ, creating a split. 149 The Second District, which
governed this case, is notably of the opinion that information resulting from
peer review sessions currently in the hands of a hospital, in particular a phy-
sician's privileges, should be discoverable. 5 ' That notion stands in stark
contrast to the holdings emerging from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts
143. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 591.
144. Id. A protective order is "[a] court order prohibiting or restricting a party from en-
gaging in conduct (esp. a legal procedure such as discovery) that unduly annoys or burdens
the opposing party or a third-party witness." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260 (8th ed. 2004).
145. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 591.
146. Id. Although the Supreme Court of Florida granted the production of documents in
the discovery process, their rationale was different than that of the Second District. Id. at 595.
The Second District's justification for reaching its decision was based upon the holding in
Bayfront Medical Center, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin. Id. at 593. In this case, the
court held that while the records used by the peer review committee for the purpose of inves-
tigative research were privileged and undiscoverable, the final write up of their findings did
not retain that same privilege and was therefore discoverable. Bayfront Med. Ctr., Inc. v.
Agency for Healthcare Admin., 741 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). How-
ever, it is important to note that this case centered on the Agency for Healthcare Administra-
tion (AHCA), which was already granted authority through certain statutes to examine par-
ticular records. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 594. The Second District in Murray amplified the
reasoning in Bayfront to now permit the discovery of physician privileges in private lawsuits,
which were based upon the communications and opinions of those in the peer review commit-
tee. Id. at 593.
147. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 591.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
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which are much more stringent regarding the discoverability of doctors' pri-
vileges. '
In first scrutinizing the rationale behind the decision in Murray, it must
be noted that the Court took the time to recognize the importance and history
of peer review in Florida. 152 Before rendering its justification for backing the
Second District's holding, the Court acknowledged its own consistency in
finding for broad statutory protection,'53 citing specifically to its decision of
Cruger v. Love (Love I1), ' 4 which has been referenced by countless other
Florida decisions in the past.' In Love II, the Supreme Court of Florida
rejected the holding in Jacksonville Medical Center, Inc. v. Akers,'56 which
held that a physician's application for hospital privileges and those docu-
ments accompanying it were discoverable and not privileged.'57 In recogniz-
ing the split, the Supreme Court of Florida referenced three specific district
decisions, in contrast to that of the Second, and conceded that as a result of
its past holdings, these district courts had followed suit and rendered similar
decisions preventing the discovery of peer review materials.'58 Per se, when
the Second District strayed from the precedent Florida had set, it yielded the
current clash.
After disagreeing with the Second District's reasoning,'59 the Court
simply stated that there was "nothing in the legislative scheme for peer re-
view that would prevent a patient from securing such information from a
hospital that has granted a physician practice privileges within the hospi-
151. Id. at 592; see also infra note 196 and accompanying text. In March of 2006, The
Fifth District of Florida rendered a decision in Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, in
which it permitted the plaintiff during discovery to obtain hospital information and documents
resulting from the peer review process. In the past, as seen in this article, the Fifth District,
along with that of the Third and Fourth Districts, had been extremely steadfast in its decisions
to prohibit medical malpractice victims from procuring peer review information during dis-
covery. While this 2006 decision lends itself toward following the holding of the Second
District in Brandon Regional Hospital v. Murray, it by no means solidifies its position on the
issue. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
152. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 591-92.
153. Id. at 592.
154. 599 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1992).
155. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 592.
156. 560 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
157. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 592.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 594; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of
Florida did not agree that the rationale in Bayfront Medical Center, Inc. was appropriate and
should be expanded to include malpractice litigation. Id. The case at hand deals with parties
in search of documents and information generated from peer review, as opposed to the latter
which deals with AHCA. Id. AHCA already has statutory permission to search these types of
documents. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 594.
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tal."' 160 It was irrelevant that the peer review committee played a hand in
determining which privileges were to be granted. 16' Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that the privileges granted to a physician play an elementary and
vital role to any patient making the decision to permit performance of a med-
ical procedure.162 Therefore, it is a patient's right to be informed about the
privileges his or her doctor possesses. 163  Because there is nothing in the
Florida Statutes that protects hospital records, even those which may be
based upon peer review analysis, the Court was not willing to stretch the
statutory protection to do so. 164
At the close of the trial, Murray's attorney, George A. Vaka, enthusias-
tically stated, "[i]t just seems to me to be a huge win for patients on an issue
that jumps out at me to be so basic and so fundamental."' 165
IV. FLORIDA DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS SPLIT
Murray seems to be an aberration, especially at a time when Florida sta-
tutory protection has provided a strong safekeeping on peer review materi-
als. 166 While Florida courts seem to agree that documents, records, and in-
formation generated directly from the peer review committee are privi-
leged, 167 the same line of thinking has failed the Second District with regard
to a hospital's list of physicians' privileges. 168 As stated previously, the Sec-
ond District's holding regarding such a discovery request vastly differs from
the holdings derived by the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts. 169 These dis-
tricts have stood strong in their almost always recurring decisions not to
permit any information related to peer review to be recoverable in discov-
ery.'70 Murray continuously cited to the Supreme Court of Florida's deci-
sion of Love H for support,' 7 ' where the Court there held that "a physician's
application for staff privileges is a record of the committee or board for pur-
160. Id.
161. Id. at 594-95.
162. Id. at 595.
163. See id.
164. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 595.
165. Ostrovsky, supra note 24. George A. Vaka is currently employed in Tampa at the
law firm of Vaka, Larson & Johnson. Id.
166. See supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 395.0191,
766.101 (2007).
167. FLA. STAT. § 766.101(5).
168. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 592-93.
169. Id. at 592.
170. Id.; see also infra note 197 and accompanying text.
171. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 592.
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poses of the statutory privilege."' 17 2 Relying on past decisions such as that,
the district courts in their own course of judgment have found that
"[d]ocuments created or considered by a hospital peer review or credential-
ing committee are privileged."' 173 Respectively, a list of hospital privileges
granted to a physician "falls within the purview of this privilege as a matter
of public policy.' ' 174 As such, the rationale of these three districts simply
does not coincide with that of the Second in Murray. 175
The following analysis illustrates Florida cases which are in direct op-
position to the decision the Supreme Court of Florida just rendered.
In Iglesias v. It's a Living, Inc., 176 a doctor was assaulted and grievously
wounded while on the property of the defendants. 177 In an action for dam-
ages, the defendants sought in discovery a list of the doctor's privileges at
any hospital he was currently working at or had worked at in the past. '78 The
trial court granted the request for such information. 179 The Third District
Court of Appeals of Florida reviewed the case and held that such a decision
by the trial court "departed from the essential requirements of law in order-
ing the discovery and that immediate relief [was] appropriate."'' 0  The
Court's rationale followed that these privileges were developed with the pur-
pose of advocating outspokenness and openness in peer review communica-
tions. " ' Disclosing a doctor's privileges would destroy the candidacy of
peer review and create a "'chilling effect' on the public. 182 Because the
defendants lacked a "'showing of exceptional necessity' or . . 'extraordi-
nary circumstances' they failed to legitimize why it was they needed such
information. '83
A second illustration of a doctor's privileges not being released in dis-
covery was seen in Boca Raton Community Hospital v. Jones.18 4 A medical
malpractice suit was brought against a practicing physician, Dr. Rankin, in
which claimants requested "Dr. Rankin's applications for staff privileges,
172. Cruger v. Love (Love 11), 599 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992).
173. Iglesias v. It's a Living, Inc., 782 So. 2d 963, 964 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
174. Id.
175. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 592-93.
176. 782 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
177. Id. at 963.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 964.
180. Id.
181. Iglesias, 782 So. 2d at 964.
182. Id. (quoting Cruger v. Love (Love I1), 599 So. 2d 111, 115 (Fla. 1992)).
183. Id. (quoting Dade County Med. Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 121 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979)).
184. 584 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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reports of reviewing committees, and memoranda, correspondence and other
documentation indicating that the doctor was given staff privileges at the
hospital."' 85 Subsequent to denying protective orders, the trial court granted
the claimants' demand for the aforementioned information. 8 6 On appeal, the
Fourth District Court of Appeals of Florida reversed, acknowledging the
confidentiality of that which was sought.' 87 The court held that the informa-
tion requested is not of a nature that should be disclosed and is accordingly
privileged. '88
In a similar case, Columbia Park Medical Center, Inc. v. Gibbs,'89 the
husband of deceased patient, Gibbs, initiated a medical malpractice action
against the hospital.'90 Gibbs requested production of the hospital privileges
of the two doctors who were responsible for his wife."'9 Claiming that such
information was privileged pursuant to Florida Statute section 766.101(5),
the hospital refused to turn over the list of privileges.'92 As per usual, the
trial court granted production of the privileges. " The Fifth District Court of
Appeals of Florida reasoned that "committee reports, including documenta-
tion that a physician was given staff privileges and delineating the privileges
extended, [were] privileged from discovery."'94
Although the Supreme Court of Florida has already rendered a decision
regarding the discovery of a hospital's list of physician privileges,"' the rift
between the districts is still important. There will most certainly be analo-
gous cases in the future and, depending upon what district they originate in,
could impact the final decision of the case.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTRICT SPLIT
Murray has left the discoverability of peer review information in Flor-
ida in a state of some abashment. Should future courts rely on the holding in
Murray and continue to presuppose that Florida peer review statutes do not
protect hospital based documents regardless of the fact that they are rooted in
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. 723 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
190. Id. at 295.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Gibbs, 723 So. 2d at 295-96.
195. Brandon Reg'I Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 590 (Fla. 2007).
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peer review communications?' 96 Or, do future courts trust in the past deci-
sions of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts, and on occasion the
Supreme Court of Florida, by supporting the broad construction of peer re-
view statutes and the concealment of information in discovery proceed-
ings? 97 Regardless of whether Florida courts in the future follow the more
liberal open door policy for peer review information in discovery or the iron
clad non-disclosure tactic, there will be implications and benefits for both.
If future courts opt to continue in the footsteps of Murray, medical mal-
practice claimants will be thrilled while hospitals and physicians will be dis-
traught. Peer review works because the committee is comprised of experts
and specialists in the field of medicine who understand what is required to
practice appropriately and safely.198 These experts and specialists, usually
physicians in the hospital, partake in peer review, many times against their
better judgment, as statutory protection guarantees them some mode of secu-
rity. 9 9 With this in mind, if future courts yield to the holding in Murray, and
hospital information founded upon peer review decisions is leaked to the
public in discovery, participating doctors will most likely entirely stop or
seriously curb their involvement in this process. 200 As it stands, they get paid
minimally, and the risks are plentiful.2 1 Without complete protection, there
will either be no doctors willing to participate in peer review, 202 or those who
do will inadequately perform and fail to speak out honestly. 23 Either way, it
is a catch-22.
On the upside, patients suffering from medical malpractice will benefit
by having a fair and just trial with all the evidence. 2°4 Following in the path
of Murray will no longer allow peer review boards to hide proof of hospital
or physician mistakes and/or carelessness °.2 5 Accordingly, injured patients
196. See id.
197. See Cruger v. Love (Love 11), 599 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992) (holding that a doctor's
application for staff privileges were protected by Florida Statutes section 766.101(5)); see
also Iglesias v. It's a Living, Inc., 782 So. 2d 963, 964 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding
that "[d]ocuments created or considered by a hospital peer review or credentialing committee
are privileged"); Gibbs, 723 So. 2d at 295 (holding that a doctor's privileges at a hospital
constitute privileged information); Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp. v. Jones, 584 So. 2d 220, 221
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a doctor's application for staff privileges and
evidence that he was actually given these privileges was confidential and not discoverable).
198. Hammack, supra note 57, at 439.
199. Scheutzow, supra note 4, at 16-17.
200. See Hammack, supra note 57, at 442-43.
201. Cate, supra note 48, at 480.
202. Id. at 482.
203. See Bassler, supra note 6, at 694.
204. See Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1183.
205. See Morter, supra note 16, at 1115.
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will now be able to successfully asseverate their rights,2 °6 without the dis-
covery process interfering and hindering the growth of their case.207 More-
over, patients seeking operations will have access to the privileges their phy-
sicians possess, which will enable them to make more informed decisions
about whether or not to proceed with the particular doctor they are seeing.20 8
At the other end of the spectrum lie the decisions of the Third, Fourth,
and Fifth District Courts.0 9 Should future courts choose to proceed in their
footsteps, hospitals and physicians being sued for malpractice will continue
to be greeted with strong statutory protection210 while those victimized will
be left stranded with only bits and pieces of information supporting their
claims.2"' In the past, the system of peer review in Florida has generally
operated according to this model of thinking.2t 2 To rehash what has already
been stated, solid statutory protection will continue to allow participants in
peer review to veraciously speak their mind and formulate decisions in the
best interest of the hospital and patients.1 3 Limiting their liability in law-
suits, physicians will maintain their active involvement in the process.2 4
Additionally, this type of security will permit peer review to continue operat-
ing to better the quality of hospital care and the treatment of patients.15
Unfortunately, this approach leaves claimants with the short end of the
stick. While courts have acknowledged that with strong statutory protection
plaintiffs may have a difficult time prosecuting their claim, they nonetheless
deem this to be irrelevant and an unconvincing justification for the disclosure
of the information sought.2t 6 As stated by critics, peer review will continue
to shield vital information from patients who seek to sue hospitals thereby
furthering injustice in today's judicial system.21 7 As such, the self policing
tactic which is strongly guarded will continue to further the "'conspiracy of
silence.'" 21
8
206. Cate, supra note 48, at 482.
207. Newton II, supra note 9, at 724.
208. Brandon Reg'l Hosp. v. Murray, 957 So. 2d 590, 595 (Fla. 2007).
209. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
211. See Newton II, supra note 9, at 724.
212. Murray, 957 So. 2d at 592.
213. Nijm, supra note 4, at 542.
214. See Moore et al., supra note 7, at 1178.
215. See Jorstad, supra note 5, at 693.
216. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
217. Graham, supra note 3, at 114.
218. Morter, supra note 16, at 1115.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is a very fine line between that which Florida peer review statutes
protect and that which they do not. As so clearly seen by the close of this
paper, it has been the legislature's goal right from the outset to provide safe
and effective medical care to patients while controlling rising health care
costs. Florida peer review statutes incontestably protect records generated
from the peer review process and any documents utilized in their considera-
tions and decision-making. However, never does it state that this protection
will linger long after the committee has reached their decision and new doc-
uments have been created by other medical bodies, even if based upon the
committee's assessments. Murray was simply the first case in which it was
acknowledged that the peer review process must end somewhere, and it starts
with the privileges a doctor is granted by a hospital. As stated by the Su-
preme Court of Florida, this information is not of a nature that should be kept
confidential as it is fundamental in any patient's decision to permit surgery.
Although there is a split among the district courts, there has been limited
rationale provided as to why, after a peer review committee convenes, newly
generated documents founded upon some of their information or decisions
should remain confidential. Perhaps after this case, physicians will be more
cautious in practicing medicine in an area they are not privileged or prepared
to do so as this information is now discoverable in civil litigation. Whilst the
peer review process is a valuable tool to the healthcare industry, and should
only continue to thrive as such, there must be boundaries. With that said, the
Florida Statutes as they stand provide excellent protection for doctors par-
ticipating in peer review, but it must stop there. Presently, only time will tell
whether Murray was the first case in a new line of thinking or simply just an
isolated decision.
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